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Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy Revisited

Colonial State and Chinese Immigrant in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia

John T. Sidel

Forty years after its publication, Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* remains a key touchstone for debates in the comparative study of democratization.¹ Many of Moore's arguments have been discredited and discarded, and his magnum opus is more often cited in passing or in footnotes and bibliographies than it is seriously treated by contemporary scholars of dictatorship and democracy. Yet the wistfulness with which scholars often refer to *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* reflects more than just aging comparativists' nostalgia for this first love of their intellectual youth. Indeed, the book still stands as a source of inspiration for scholars of comparative politics who try to combine global breadth of analysis with historical and sociological depth. In continuing debates on global patterns of variance in democratization, Moore's work is foundational for scholars rooted in the tradition of comparative historical sociology, much as Seymour Martin Lipset's 1959 article on the "social requisites of democracy" is for those engaged in large-n quantitative analysis.² Small wonder that the most recent major study in this field by scholars informed by game theory and rational choice theory has been published under the title *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, in a thinly veiled attack on both Moore's forty-year-old classic and the broader sociologically informed research it has inspired.³

This article returns to *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, not out of nostalgia, but to retrieve one of Moore's key formulations for deployment in the continuing debate on cross-national patterns of variance in dictatorship and democracy around the world. Following Valerie Bunce's arguments in favor of engaging in cross-national comparative analysis within regions before comparing across regions, it focuses on Southeast Asia, understood to include such diverse countries as Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.⁴ The analysis draws on Moore's work to develop an analytical framework for explaining the patterns of dictatorship and democracy across these countries of Southeast Asia, before concluding with some observations of broader relevance to the study of democratization around the world.

Southeast Asia offers a particularly interesting subset of cases with which to reexamine a set of important recent arguments concerning dictatorship and democracy. The particular mix of democratic and authoritarian regimes in the region provides a clear challenge for cross-national comparative studies. If democracy is taken to mean the effective subordination of the state apparatus to elected officials, regular and competitive elections in which turnover of elected officials is observed, and a set of civil liberties, including freedom of the press and of association, then only three countries—the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia—have experienced periods of democratic rule.⁵ If the diverse forms of authoritarianism in the region—Communist party-states (Laos, Vietnam), effective one party states under pseudo-parliamentary auspices (Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore), monarchical (Brunei) and military (Burma) regimes—are considered from another perspective, the longevity of dictatorships in the remaining seven cases must also be explained.⁶

Indeed, the only serious scholarly effort to examine democratization throughout the entire region abandons structuralist cross-national comparative analysis in favor of a more voluntarist set of single country accounts.⁷ Attempts to explain Southeast Asian patterns of democracy and dictatorship through more ambitious, global theorizing have likewise proved unsatisfactory. For example, the persistence of effective one party rule for nearly a half-century in two of the wealthiest of these countries, Malaysia and Singapore, has undermined the conventional wisdom regarding the significance of economic growth and the expansion of the urban middle class in democratization. Enduring military rule in Burma since 1962 likewise calls into question Barbara Geddes' arguments regarding the importance of the institutional forms of authoritarianism in facilitating or foreclosing democratization, as the Burmese generals have, *contra* Geddes, outlasted personalistic dictatorship in the Philippines and a hybrid regime in Indonesia, while competing strongly with the one party states of the region in terms of longevity.⁸ The complex patterns of divergence between—and change within—countries like Indonesia and Malaysia similarly defy efforts to generalize about the relationship between democratization and quantifiable economic variables, such as inequality and oil revenues, or cultural variables, such as Islam.⁹

By contrast, a set of structural conditions that have prefigured patterns of dictatorship and democracy throughout Southeast Asia can be identified. These conditions are rooted in the history of the region during what is often referred to as the colonial era (c. 1850–c. 1940). The point of departure is thus the tradition of comparative historical sociology in general and Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* in particular. Of special interest here is Moore's claim that "a vigorous and independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of parliamentary democracy." In his memorably Marxian conclusion: "No bourgeois, no democracy."¹⁰ Moore's proposition can be elaborated and defended in the contemporary Southeast Asian context. The establishment of democracy in the Philippines, Thailand, and, most recently, Indonesia and the continued entrenchment of authoritarianism in the other countries of the region can in no

small measure be understood in terms of the degree of vigor and independence enjoyed by a given country's bourgeoisie, understood here not in the pluralist sense of an urban middle class, but in the Marxist sense of a capitalist class enjoying ownership and control of the means of production.

Yet, as Moore himself cautioned, "a general statement about the historical preconditions of democracy or authoritarianism...would very likely be so broad as to be abstractly platitudinous."¹¹ Beyond platitudes or spurious correlations, moreover, there is the obvious danger of a tautological association of democracy with a vigorous and independent bourgeoisie, as it could be argued that only under democratic regimes are vigorous and independent bourgeoisies to be found. Thus, comparative historical analysis specifies three, interrelated, determining factors in class formation in modern Southeast Asia: the impact of state policies and market forces upon the assimilation and upward mobility of immigrant (mostly Chinese) merchant communities in the colonial era; the outcome of struggles for national independence after World War II; and the extent of state and foreign control over the commanding heights of the national economy since independence.

While variation in these three factors has prefigured variance in the vigor and independence of the bourgeoisie across Southeast Asia, this variance in the identity and power of the capitalist class is also linked to patterns of dictatorship and democracy in contemporary Southeast Asia. The causal mechanisms and processes at work here can be understood schematically in terms of exit, voice, and loyalty, as famously introduced by Albert Hirschman nearly forty years ago.¹² Vigorous and independent bourgeoisies in the Philippines, Thailand, and, in recent years, Indonesia are ones capable of exercising what Hirschman called exit, whether by withdrawing financial backing from incumbent administrations during elections, supporting the campaigns of opposition movements, parties, and politicians, or engaging in capital flight. These are also capitalist classes fully confident about using what Hirschman called voice, in terms of direct participation in elections, in government service, and in the making of state policy. The loyalty of these bourgeoisies is neither automatic nor unconditional, unconstrained as they are by the kinds of limitations and restrictions which continue to hamper the exercise of exit and voice by their counterparts elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Thus, the vigor and independence of the bourgeoisie in the Philippines, Thailand, and, in recent years, Indonesia has constituted a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for the establishment and consolidation of democracy in these countries.

Chinese Immigrant and Colonial State: The Plural Society and Its Vicissitudes

The formation of capitalist classes in Southeast Asia merits close comparative historical and sociological analysis. As is well known and amply documented, a distinguishing feature of the incorporation of Southeast Asia into the world capitalist economy in the second half of the nineteenth century was the predominance of immigrants from the southern

coast of China and their offspring in comprador functions and domestic capital formation in the region.¹³ In this mid nineteenth century Southeast Asian context of relatively sparse population, predominantly subsistence-oriented agriculture, and considerably limited domestic capital formation, immigrants from densely populated and intensively commercialized southern China were far better placed than their local counterparts or forced earlier to assume leading roles in the intertwined processes of agricultural commercialization and urban growth, as wage laborers, compradors, commodity processors, and revenue farmers for the colonial states in the region.

Yet by the end of the nineteenth century, as Chinese immigrants swelled the ranks of middlemen, moneylenders, and revenue farmers throughout Southeast Asia, market forces and state policies had already begun to work towards the crystallization of distinctively—and decisively—different paths of identity formation among their offspring.¹⁴ In this regard, two clear and contrasting patterns can be identified. In the first instance, in colonies like Burma, Indochina, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies, a configuration memorably described by J. S. Furnivall as the “plural society” emerged, characterized by an ethnically segmented division of labor protected and reproduced by patterns of “racial” segregation.

It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labor along racial lines. Natives, Chinese, Indians and Europeans all have different functions, and within each major group subsections have particular occupations. There is, as it were, a caste system, but without the religious basis that incorporates caste in social life in India.¹⁵

Such a “plural society” crystallized most famously, of course, in British colonial Malaya, where nineteenth century patterns of labor recruitment, deployment, and control¹⁶ and subsequent policies towards agriculture,¹⁷ administration,¹⁸ language and education,¹⁹ and religion²⁰ discouraged the assimilation and intermarriage of Chinese immigrants into Malay society and encouraged instead the hardening of Chinese and Malay identities.²¹ Given the sheer size of the Chinese population, the perceived backwardness of the Malay peasantry and aristocracy, and the racist logic of the British colonial state, paternalistic policies were also adopted with the avowed aim of “protecting” the rights of the “native” population from “alien” (that is, Chinese, but not European) predators.²²

Similarly, in nineteenth century Dutch colonial Java, where the flow of Chinese immigrants was proportionately far smaller and less concentrated in wage labor, children born to Chinese immigrant men and native women, who came to be known as *peranakan*, were legally and administratively designated as Chinese and subjected to policies of segregation and separate administration and taxation.²³ While Chinese opium farmers were allowed to extend networks of distributors, enforcers, and spies into rural areas, Dutch regulations confined the vast majority of Chinese to urban ghettos and required short-term passes for travel outside them, thus “foster[ing] exploitative economic relations

between Peranakans and Javans even as [they] inhibited more egalitarian neighborly relations across the racial divide.”²⁴ Similar forms of Furnivall’s plural society likewise emerged in the core export zones of British Burma and French Indochina, where colonial policies combined with proximity to India and China, respectively, to make for patterns of segregation between the local populations and the immigrant Chettiar and Chinese communities, whose leading members were predominant in mercantile activities, moneylending, and landownership.²⁵

In the Philippines and Siam, by contrast, a distinctly different pattern of intermarriage and assimilation into indigenous societies crystallized in the course of the nineteenth century. In those parts of the Philippine archipelago colonized by Spain, intermarriage between Chinese immigrant men (*chinos*) and native women (*indias*) was actively encouraged and formally institutionalized by the Catholic Church and colonial authorities, with *mestizos* (the offspring of such unions) recognized as a distinctive administrative category but allowed to travel and change residence freely and permitted to compete for local government positions along with members of the native population (*indios*).²⁶ In the latter half of the nineteenth century, moreover, as the opening of Philippine ports to foreign trade (and a new surge of Chinese immigration) heralded a period of dramatic economic and social change, the system of ethnic segregation fell into decline and disuse. In this context, the Chinese *mestizos*, inheriting the capital and cash economy experience of their *chino* forefathers and the freedoms of their *india* or *mestiza* mothers, rose to prominence, not only as compradors for western firms, moneylenders, and landowners, but also as *Filipinos* leading struggles to break down Spanish colonial barriers to “native” upward mobility in administrative, educational, ecclesiastic, and economic circuits.²⁷

Similarly, in post-Bowring Treaty (1855) Siam, Chinese immigrants and their offspring profited enormously from the rapid expansion of paddy cultivation, using both their unrestricted access to the Thai market and their connections with Chinese merchants in Hong Kong and Singapore to dominate the rice and retail trade.²⁸ During this period, moreover, the children of Chinese immigrant men and Thai women enjoyed broad freedom to choose between identifying themselves as Chinese (by wearing a queue and paying a head tax) or as Thai (by cutting their hair and performing labor services at the behest of a Thai patron).²⁹ Given the essentially cultural rather than racial definition of ethnicity prevailing in fin-de-siècle Siam, “anyone who used a Thai name, spoke the language, and behaved as a Thai was accepted as a Thai regardless of ancestry.” Thus, as G. William Skinner has noted, “the movement from Chinese society into the Thai elite consequently became a veritable flood in the 19th century, and by 1900 Chinese ancestry was common among Thai bureaucratic nobles.”³⁰

The long-term significance of these contrasting patterns of late nineteenth century identity—and class—formation is abundantly evident in the distinctly differing responses of Southeast Asians of Chinese ancestry to key developments in subsequent years. By the second decade of the twentieth century, even as colonial states in Southeast Asia (and

the Chakri dynasty in Siam) were phasing out their revenue farms and regulatory regimes for immigrant communities, the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and the ensuing chaos of the Republican period held dramatic implications for the overseas Chinese: an unprecedented flow of new immigrants to the region, including, for the first time, significant numbers of women; a consequent growth in the numbers of those born in China or to parents both of whom were born in China (known as *totok* or *singkeh*); and a related trend towards what some scholars have termed “resinification,” most visibly in language, education, and the activities of such movements as the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

These trends, which ended abruptly with the CCP victory in 1949, produced dramatically diverging outcomes in Southeast Asia, along the lines of divergence suggested above. In the classic plural society of British Malaya, for example, resinification proceeded quite far, as amply evidenced by the successes of the KMT and the CCP in the colony.³¹ In Dutch Java, where the Chinese immigrant community was far smaller, pan-Chinese *totok* movements achieved less in the face of *peranakan* and Dutch resistance, but in any event *peranakan* Chinese were impelled “in the direction of the ruling class of Dutch and Eurasians,” rather than towards the Javanese aristocracy (the *priyayi*).³²

In Siam, by contrast, Chinese assimilation into Thai society during this period slowed but by no means stopped, with the absence of an intermediate *peranakan* community and of Thai barriers to intermarriage guaranteeing a resumption of the earlier pattern after 1949.³³ Meanwhile, this emerging Sino-Thai (*lukjin*) mercantile class amassed great wealth and capital through the rice trade in the interwar period and, following the Japanese ouster of western firms during World War II, the establishment of private commercial banks in Bangkok.³⁴ As for the Philippines during the American colonial period, the early political empowerment of the nascent Chinese *mestizo* commercial and landowning class, as elected local executives and national legislators with virtually unrestrained powers over a rapidly expanded and Filipinized bureaucracy, facilitated capital accumulation on an unprecedented scale. Thus transformed into a ruling Filipino oligarchy, the Chinese *mestizo* elite neither indulged in enthusiastic resinification efforts nor engaged in effective nationalist, anti-Chinese (or, for that matter, anticolonial) activities.³⁵

In sum, the diverging patterns of colonial era identity formation for Chinese immigrants and their offspring held significant implications for the vigor and independence of the domestic bourgeoisies that were to emerge in Southeast Asia in the postwar, postindependence era. In those former colonies where plural society arrangements and segregationist policies prevailed and prevented Chinese assimilation and upward mobility into native societies (Burma, Indochina, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies), the overwhelmingly Chinese (or Chettiar) capitalist classes which resurfaced after World War II were socially stigmatized and politically compromised by alien or pariah entrepreneur status. In those nation-states where Chinese assimilation and upward mobility had proceeded virtually unimpeded in the colonial era (the Philippines and Thailand), by con-

trast, effectively domestic capitalist classes emerged whose alien ancestry did not present obstacles to their cultural, economic, and political ascendance. Yet to understand the full implications of these diverging patterns of identity and class formation for dictatorship and democracy in Southeast Asia, the impact of postwar transitions to independence on foreign and state capital in the region must first be discussed, including, however briefly, the former colonies of Burma and French Indochina and the micro-states of Brunei Darussalam and Singapore.

Nationalist Struggles and Neocolonial Residues: State and Foreign Capital

Beyond the territories of Java, Malaya, the Philippines, and Siam, Chinese (and, in Burma, Chettiar Indian) immigrants and their offspring pursued analogous paths of capital accumulation and class formation elsewhere in colonial era Southeast Asia, as compradors for western firms, moneylenders, and landowners. Yet their position in the postwar period depended heavily upon the outcomes of nationalist struggles for independence and the related implications for state and foreign capital. In this regard, the contrast between Burma and French Indochina, on the one hand, and Brunei and Singapore, on the other, is most instructive.

In Burma and Vietnam, the transitions from colonial rule resulted from the pressures exerted by nationalist movements for a form of independence that was both political and economic, and thus for restrictions on capitalism—and foreign capitalists—viewed as tainted by their association with western imperialism. While the reasons behind the strengths and successes of these movements (and the differences between them) lie beyond the scope of this article, the nature of the regimes they established upon achieving independence seriously constrained the opportunities for private capital accumulation and bourgeois political ascendance. In Burma, a parliamentary regime (not entirely unlike neighboring India) with vaguely statist policies gave way to an avowedly socialist military successor whose economic isolationism, restrictions on private landownership, and nationalization of trade and manufacturing drove away most of the remaining Indian population and stifled the growth of a domestic capitalist class.³⁶ Meanwhile, in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the victories of revolutionary movements and the establishment of state socialist regimes by 1975 foretold delinkage from the world capitalist economy, party-state control over the commanding heights of the economy, and restrictions of varying severity on private capital accumulation.

Given this common backdrop of state control over the commanding heights of the economy and very late and limited industrialization, the absence of a domestic bourgeoisie has placed definite limitations on the prospects for democracy in the still predominantly rural countries of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Even today, none of these countries has had much in the way of a domestic business class that enjoys independence from the ruling party-state, or for that matter an urban middle class outside the

ranks of the state bureaucracy. In Vietnam, since the onset of market reforms in the 1980s, the prevailing strategy of industrialization through joint ventures between state and foreign enterprises has further delayed the emergence and mobilization of domestic social forces with significant resources and autonomy from the regime.³⁷ In Burma, despite the official abandonment of socialism in the late 1980s and the admission of foreign investment in natural resource extraction and other sectors of the economy, the small size and weakness of the local business class have helped the military regime keep oppositional forces demobilized for well over a decade.³⁸ Even in Cambodia, where United Nations-supervised elections in 1993 were supposed to usher in a transition to capitalist democracy, Hun Sen and other remnants of the Vietnamese Communist puppet regime of 1979–89 have retained unbroken control of the state apparatus under the auspices of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), with limited industrialization proceeding largely under the auspices of foreign capital.³⁹

In the two highly urbanized and affluent microstates of the region, Brunei and Singapore, by contrast, just as the carefully stage-managed transition to independence foreclosed the revolutionary path to state socialism, so did the continued predominance of foreign and state capital forestall the bourgeois road to democracy. In both countries the captains of industry—the chiefs of multinational corporations and the managers of state enterprises—have had little reason (or, it could be argued, opportunity) to press for greater political freedoms. In Brunei, an overwhelming dependence upon oil exports has underpinned a form of monarchical rentier state reminiscent of Kuwait and other Gulf sultanates.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, in the former colonial entrepôt of Singapore, export-oriented industrialization and a shift into high tech production and financial services have been motored almost entirely by foreign firms and state enterprises, leaving domestic capital economically dwarfed and politically cowed.⁴¹ Despite the continuing expansion of the urban middle class over the decades since independence, social pressures for regime change in Singapore thus remain weak, and the People's Action Party (PAP) has faced no serious challenge to its monopoly on state power since the early to mid 1960s.

In short, while various forms of state socialism and slow industrial growth in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam have effectively prevented the emergence of a domestic bourgeoisie, in Brunei and Singapore the condominium between foreign and state capital has certainly circumscribed the resources and leverage available to local business. Thus, both the poorest and the richest countries in Southeast Asia appear to confirm, if only counterfactually, Barrington Moore's thesis that a vigorous and independent bourgeoisie is a necessary (if not sufficient) precondition for democracy. Beyond such outlying cases, moreover, the examples of the Philippines and Thailand offer additional supporting evidence, as the patterns of colonial era identity and class formation in the two countries has proven decisive for democracy in the postwar period.

Assimilated Chinese Capitalists and Democracies: The Philippines and Thailand

Indeed, the Philippines and Thailand provide two positive cases that help to clinch the argument that Moore's linkage of democracy to a vigorous and independent bourgeoisie is applicable to contemporary Southeast Asia. In both countries, the assimilation and upward mobility of Chinese merchants in the colonial era allowed for the postwar emergence of domestic capitalist classes free from stigmatization as aliens and pariahs and consequently, in Moore's words, "the development of a group in society with an independent economic base, which attacks obstacles to a democratic version of capitalism that have been inherited from the past."⁴²

In the Philippines, the Chinese *mestizo* commercial and landowning elite continued to ascend economically and politically in the early postwar period, largely unimpeded by the kind of obstacles inherited from independence struggles and concerns about alien economic domination elsewhere in the region. In the 1950s and 1960s established Chinese and Chinese *mestizo* business magnates undertook a new phase of capital accumulation, through internal colonization of remaining frontier areas, import-substitution industrialization, and diversification into private commercial banking.⁴³ Meanwhile, of course, they enjoyed unrestricted access to state offices and resources, as American liberation and early granting of independence restored American-style democratic institutions developed in the colonial era and, in the virtual absence of postwar revolutionary nationalist struggle, the electoral contests between rival political machines resumed. The independent economic resources of this oligarchy, in landownership, the financial sector, and industry, combined with the American-style division and separation of powers in the state to encourage fierce competition and constant turnover in electoral politics, rather than the construction of a single party regime.⁴⁴ As for the modest numbers of first generation Chinese immigrants in the archipelago, the previously established pattern of relatively unimpeded upward mobility and assimilation prevailed. Despite prewar exclusion of such Chinese from citizenship and landownership and early postwar nationalization of the rice, corn, and retail trades, Filipino Chinese naturalization, assimilation, and capital accumulation proceeded apace, and some wealthy Chinese magnates even enjoyed considerable political power, as elected local officials, legislators, and close relatives or associates of presidents.⁴⁵

The authoritarian interlude (1972–1986) under Ferdinand Marcos reflected an anomalous departure from the broader pattern of oligarchical democracy and virtually direct class rule by the Chinese *mestizo* capitalist class in the Philippines. Marcos had first amassed enormous powers by exploiting the presidential prerogatives permitted under the 1935 constitution (in an unprecedented two terms in office) and assumed dictatorial powers as an elected incumbent chief executive. His unprecedented success in winning reelection in 1969 and his ability to impose martial law in 1972, it has been argued, owed much to the strengthening of executive autonomy at the expense of congressional and oligarchical influence amidst a protracted crisis of import-substitution industrialization. As

private industries and banks faced increasing difficulties in staying afloat and confronted a rising tide of social unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Marcos expanded the reach and resources of the state through a massive infusion of foreign funds from the U.S. government and international financial institutions and the centralization of power in the hands of an increasingly authoritarian president.⁴⁶

Filipino businessmen acquiesced in the martial law regime through the 1970s, but by the mid 1980s they found both their economic interests and their social position severely threatened by the weight of crony capitalism under Marcos's regime.⁴⁷ In 1986, against the backdrop of virtual state bankruptcy, deepening economic crisis, and rising mass mobilization led by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its various front groups, a business-backed opposition movement succeeded in forcing Marcos from power and restoring a competitive electoral system in the country. Since that time, oligarchical democracy in the Philippines has been reconsolidated, with Chinese *mestizo* business magnates and their proxies dominating both houses of congress and business-backed episodes of people power in the streets of Manila disciplining—or, as in 2001, deposing—presidents deemed to be insufficiently responsive to the broader interests of the capitalist class.⁴⁸

Meanwhile, in Thailand in the early postwar era the Sino-Thai business class ascended to the seats of state power in a process of fitful democratization. From the prewar rice trade Thai Chinese merchants moved into commercial banking in the 1940s and 1950s and in subsequent decades agro-business ventures and manufacturing industries, aided like their Filipino counterparts by tie-ups with foreign capital.⁴⁹ While nationalist measures adopted in the 1930s and after World War II (that is, the peak years of Chinese immigration) included the creation of state enterprises and the enactment of laws to restrict Chinese economic activities, pariah status in the 1950s gave way to liberalization and assimilation by the 1960s, a trend facilitated by the absence of prior colonial plural society arrangements or popular nationalist independence struggles.

By the 1970s, moreover, as urbanization and industrialization got underway, the mobilization of emerging new social forces against the Thai army, successor to the monarchy since 1932, began to weaken the obstacles from above to the direct exercise of power by the ascendant Sino-Thai bourgeoisie. The first phase of this fitful process began with the student-led overthrow of military rule in 1973 and a brief civilian interlude, in which the military's established proxies in parliament shared power with independent members of parliament, ranging from businessmen to socialist politicians.⁵⁰ While this process suffered a phase of violent backlash and retrenchment with a military coup in 1976, by the 1980s the defeat of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and the effective removal of all radical threats from below allowed for the emergence of a parliament dominated by provincial businessmen and proxies of the major Sino-Thai-owned Bangkok banks, now enjoying greater access to and control over the state apparatus.⁵¹ This process of expanding civilian influence through the parliament and the cabinet proceeded gradually during the 1980s, culminating in an entirely elected civilian government in 1988, but suffering

a second reversal with a military coup in 1991. Following the electoral defeat and popular overthrow of the short-lived coup-installed military government in 1992, a rapid succession of civilian coalition governments over the next five years, and the enactment of constitutional reforms eliminating residual military prerogatives in 1997, Thai democracy appeared to have been effectively consolidated.⁵² Yet still another phase of retrenchment loomed on the horizon.

Encouraged by the 1997 constitution and impelled by the economic crisis that began in the same year, major Sino-Thai business conglomerates and Bangkok banks moved to assert even more direct control over the Thai state during a period of reform. Eager to outmaneuver both established provincial politicians and emerging social movements in the new electoral system, and anxious to shield themselves from the dangers of liberalization and deregulation under an IMF stabilization program, they backed the formation of a new party, Thai Rak Thai, led by Thaksin Shinawatra, a leading Sino-Thai tycoon.⁵³ Thai Rak Thai swept to victory in the 2001 elections, with Thaksin assuming the premiership and filling his cabinet with leading businessmen and bankers; the elections of 2005 produced a majority for Thai Rak Thai and promised a second term for Thaksin.⁵⁴ Yet this unprecedented concentration of power in the hands of a single party—and a single businessman-cum-politician—inevitably generated a backlash, culminating in a coup d'état in late 2006 and the formation of a transitional government by the Thai military.⁵⁵ As of this writing, the path to a resumption of parliamentary democracy in Thailand—through a new constitution and competitive elections or through popular demonstrations as in 1991–92—has yet to be cleared. But the broad pattern of democratization remains clear: fitful movement towards the assumption of increasingly direct control of state power through elections by a bourgeoisie of largely assimilated Chinese ancestry, as in the Philippines. In both countries, the pattern of class formation prefigured the emergence of properly domestic, national bourgeoisies fully enabled—and increasingly inclined—to assert claims to rule through the institutions of oligarchical democracy.

Pariah Capitalists and Authoritarian Regimes: Malaysia and Indonesia

This pattern stands in apparent contrast with the greater longevity of authoritarian rule in neighboring Malaysia and Indonesia, countries whose histories of class formation followed very different paths from those observed in the Philippines and Thailand. Indeed, as noted above, embryonic local capitalist classes emerged in the colonial era in both British Malaya and Dutch Java, but classes whose alien and pariah status left them socially stigmatized and politically compromised vis-à-vis the indigenous populations of the two colonies. Thus, in both Malaysia and Indonesia the postindependence assumption of power by avowedly nationalist native elites foretold the political marginalization of Chinese capital and the promotion of Malay and Indonesian “sons of the soil” (the so-called *bumiputra* and *pribumi*, respectively) as putatively indigenous businessmen in

their own right. Yet the refashioning of these capitalist classes along avowedly more national lines since independence and the relationship between these refashioned capitalist classes and the state have differed between the two countries. These differences help to explain the diverging pattern of enduring authoritarian rule in Malaysia to date and belated democratization in Indonesia since 1998, a pattern that requires careful unpacking in the light of the arguments advanced here.

In the case of Malaysia, the refashioning of a properly Malaysian capitalist class has proceeded under the rubric of a well-institutionalized affirmative action program for *bumiputra* (Malay) capital and under the auspices of effective one party rule. In the first decade following Malaysia's carefully stage-managed decolonization, British-owned banks and corporations retained the dominant position in the Malaysian economy they had enjoyed under colonial rule, with Chinese businessmen remaining as their key local partners and the Malay aristocracy, now represented in government by UMNO (the United Malays National Organization), continuing its acquiescence in laissez-faire economic policies. Although UMNO, the leading party of the Malay majority, dominated the ruling National Alliance (*Barisan Nasional*), the minority Chinese business-led Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) largely funded UMNO's election campaigns during this period and was rewarded with the key economic portfolios in the cabinet.⁵⁶

Yet with the near-defeat of the *Barisan Nasional* in the May 1969 elections and the postelection communal violence that left hundreds of Chinese casualties in its wake, a perhaps inevitable move to create a properly indigenous, national bourgeoisie began to unfold. As Jomo K. S. has noted:

In the situation in Malaya after independence, the governing group in control of the state machinery owned relatively little of the modern capitalist sector. This situation was simply unstable in the long run and the status quo could not be maintained forever. The post-colonial ascendance of the Malay petty bourgeoisie to state power unveiled a new stage in class contention as this group sought to utilize political power to develop its own economic base.⁵⁷

Indeed, in the wake of the May 1969 riots, and under the auspices of an essentially martial law regime, a new economic policy was launched in 1970 to promote a *bumiputra* (that is, Malay) capitalist class through elaborate affirmative action programs and an unprecedented expansion of the role of the Malaysian state in the economy.⁵⁸

This change had two major political consequences for the Malaysian capitalist class. First, the proliferation of government regulations and restrictions upon non-Malay participation in the economy since 1970 left the Malaysian Chinese business class highly dependent upon Malay (that is, UMNO) politicians for protection, patronage, and so-called Ali-Baba business partnerships. The extent of this dependency gradually rendered the MCA redundant as a vehicle for promoting Chinese corporate interests and a broker for access to state patronage and preferential regulatory treatment, while strengthening the position of UMNO.⁵⁹ Second, the extent and variety of government programs designed to promote *bumiputra* (Malay) business through preferential loans, contracts, concessions, and state-owned enterprises spawned a new class of Malay capitalists even more closely identified

with the ruling party.⁶⁰ Over the three and a half decades since the proclamation of the new economic policy, the Malaysian capitalist class has thus become somewhat less narrowly identified with a problematic pariah entrepreneurial minority, but no more independent vis-à-vis the holders of state power (UMNO) and therefore not much more able or inclined to push for democracy. Consequently, even the most potent electoral challenge of recent years, the *Barisan Alternatif* of 1999, failed to dislodge the UMNO-led *Barisan Nasional* or to create an enduring oppositional bloc strong enough to check, much less overturn, effective UMNO one party rule.

In the case of Indonesia, by contrast, the refashioning of a national capitalist class proceeded under less institutionalized and unified rubrics for the promotion of *pribumi* business and under more hybrid—and less stable—forms of authoritarian rule, which eventually gave way to democracy on the eve of the twenty-first century. As in Malaysia, the early years following independence in Indonesia were ones of experimentation with constitutional democracy (1950–57) but gave way to a martial law regime alongside state nationalization of Dutch and other foreign economic interests in the archipelago, the imposition of new restrictions on the role of the alien Chinese minority in the economy, and half-hearted efforts to encourage an indigenous (*pribumi*) national bourgeoisie in the late 1950s and early 1960s.⁶¹ As in Malaysia, the shift to authoritarian rule in Indonesia involved not only considerable violence, but also intimidation of the Chinese minority, thus enhancing the leverage of the state over the pariah capitalist class. Indeed, in the mid 1960s the consolidation of a full-blown military regime in Indonesia was achieved amidst anticommunist pogroms that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives across the archipelago and were accompanied by the imposition of myriad restrictions on ethnic Chinese cultural and social life in the country.⁶²

In sharp contrast with Malaysia, however, the ensuing pattern of capital accumulation in Indonesia under authoritarian auspices did not unfold under a well institutionalized rubric for developing an indigenous (*pribumi*) capitalist class. With the consolidation of military rule under Major General Suharto in the mid to late 1960s, the regime reopened the country to foreign investment and undertook decisive measures to jump-start capitalist development, through successive phases of import-substitution and export-oriented industrialization. Significantly, however, the weakness of the indigenous *pribumi* bourgeoisie and the alien status of Chinese capital combined with the nationalist pretensions and bureaucratic interests of the regime and the onset of the oil boom in the 1970s to encourage a distinctively *dirigiste* form of domestic capital accumulation, as evident in the centrality of state banks, enterprises, and regulations in the economy.⁶³ Throughout the 1970s the commanding heights of the economy remained under the control of state enterprises, multinational corporations, and a set of huge conglomerates owned by Chinese financiers close to the palace, which were heavily favored in terms of state capital, contracts, concessions, and tax, tariff, and regulatory policies.⁶⁴

Only after economic liberalization measures in the mid 1980s did an emerging indigenous (*pribumi*) business class begin to show capacity for articulating its interests and apply-

ing pressure vis-à-vis the state in Indonesia.⁶⁵ With liberalization and the attendant shift of emphasis away from petroleum and other natural resource extraction and into export-oriented manufacturing came a flood of foreign investment, a full decade of rapid economic growth, and a dramatic expansion of the ranks and resources of the Indonesian business class. This trend was evident in the increasing prominence and political influence of *pribumi* businessmen at the local and national levels and, more generally, the increasingly evident indebtedness of bureaucrats, military officers, and legislators in the national parliament to various business sponsors (and their involvement in business themselves). In Jakarta and other major Indonesian cities the skyscrapers built to house the new conglomerates, banks, and investment houses began to tower over the offices of the bloated state apparatus, including those of the powerful armed forces.⁶⁶

In contrast with the highly institutionalized affirmative action program for the promotion of *bumiputra* (Malay) capital in Malaysia, the refashioning of the capitalist class in a more national direction unfolded under a very different institutional rubric and proved much more divisive and destabilizing in Indonesia. With the onset of economic liberalization and accelerated growth came a three-pronged strategy by Suharto's regime to neutralize the potentially destabilizing effects of what Richard Robison famously described as the "rise of capital." First, the regime retreated from its open embrace of the Chinese conglomerates in favor of the encouragement of *pribumi* business in rhetoric (if not always in reality) and, by the mid 1990s, the increasing intimidation of Chinese businessmen through anti-Chinese riots and other disturbances, whose real and threatened occurrence allowed for intensified extortion by state officials providing protection to the pariah capitalists.⁶⁷ Second, and in tandem with this trend, the regime provided an ostensibly Islamist ideological and institutional rubric for the promotion of *pribumi* capital in ICMI, the All-Indonesian Association of Islamic Intellectuals, whose chairman, long-time Suharto associate and minister for research and development B. J. Habibie, controlled a huge empire of state enterprises and enjoyed considerable powers to dispense patronage in the form of government concessions and contracts and positions within the apparatuses of the state.⁶⁸ Finally, then president Suharto allowed various members of his own family, especially his children Tutut, Bambang, and Tommy, to emerge as major figures in the business world themselves, with vast diversified conglomerates assuming prominent, if not preeminent, positions in banking, real estate, construction, telecommunications, and a host of other sectors of the economy.⁶⁹

For nearly a decade this three-pronged strategy succeeded in containing and channeling the political energies of the expanding capitalist class within the structures of the authoritarian regime, yet it eventually gave way to its internal contradictions and tensions. In 1998, amidst deepening economic crisis and mounting speculation about the succession to Suharto, the underlying conflict between these three strands of the Indonesian capitalist class came to the surface. As Suharto maneuvered to save his own children's business empires from disintegration or dismantling and to position his daughter for the succession to the presidency, Chinese and *pribumi* capital threatened to under-

mine the foundations of his rule. In response, in the early months of 1998 elements in the regime encouraged strident anti-Chinese rhetoric and instigated small-scale anti-Chinese riots around the archipelago. ICMI chairman and archeconomic nationalist Habibie was also elevated to the largely ceremonial post of vice-president, all in the hope of buying business loyalty, in Albert Hirschman's sense of the term, through intimidation and cooptation. Yet with the instigation of massive anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta and other major cities in mid May 1998 large-scale capital flight (and the departure of tens of thousands of Chinese businessmen) confronted the regime with the consequences of capitalist exit. Within a week, the representatives of *pribumi* business inside and outside the regime had succeeded in using their voice. As student protests moved from the university campuses onto the streets, fourteen cabinet ministers resigned, and key figures in the hitherto rubber-stamp parliament called for Suharto to step down, the long-time dictator ceded the presidency to his recently anointed vice-president, Habibie.⁷⁰

Although Habibie's ascension to the presidency inspired hopes and fears of an UMNO-style incorporation of the *pribumi* business class into a reconsolidated authoritarian regime, the conditions that had led to Suharto's downfall worked against this possible scenario in Indonesia in 1998–99. The ongoing economic crisis restricted the state resources available for a new-economic-policy-style initiative to buy *pribumi* loyalty, and the massive exit of Chinese and foreign capital (and capitalists) from the country in the first half of 1998 revealed the debilitating costs of attempting to suppress business voice. Thus, Habibie moved swiftly in the direction of political and economic liberalization: anti-Chinese violence, intimidation, and discrimination were drastically reduced.⁷¹ Nationalist economic initiatives were quietly dropped. And competitive elections were held in June 1999, with Habibie ceding the presidency to an indirectly selected successor in October of the same year.⁷² Indonesian democracy became consolidated in the following years, with a shift to a fully elected parliament and the country's first direct presidential elections yielding a popularly elected new government in 2004.

In some measure, the emerging signs of business prominence and the power in Indonesia's newly consolidated democracy appear to mirror the by now well established patterns of money and machine politics in the Philippines and Thailand, thus lending concrete substance to the well-worn term "bourgeois democracy" in the Southeast Asian context. Indeed, complaints of money politics and undue business influence over legislation and government regulation are legion, and one of the country's leading *pribumi* businessmen was elected in 2004 as vice-president and subsequently assumed the leadership of the leading party in the national parliament. Other *pribumi* businessmen have likewise come to assume a more prominent role in local politics, as seen in the composition of local assemblies and in the ranks of candidates for local executive posts. Yet, as suggested by the election of a retired army general to the presidency in 2004, the striking success of many former civil servants in winning executive posts in local elections since that time, the continuing invisibility of Chinese business in the

political arena, and the abiding weakness of serious parliamentary checks on executive power, the historically established insulation of state power from (pariah) capitalist scrutiny and constraint dies hard, even under democratic auspices.⁷³

Conclusion: The Structural Preconditions for Dictatorship and Democracy

The postwar history of Southeast Asia provides considerable evidence to confirm Barrington Moore's argument that a vigorous and independent bourgeoisie is indispensable—that is, necessary but not sufficient—for democracy. Moreover, a comparative historical analysis supports subsidiary arguments that identify the specific conditions that have facilitated or prevented a pattern of class formation conducive to democracy. In those countries where colonial era plural society arrangements left the predominantly immigrant Chinese merchant class segregated and stigmatized as alien (Malaysia, Indonesia) or where transitions to independence left the commanding heights of the economy in the hands of state-socialist regimes (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) or multinational corporations and state institutions (Brunei, Singapore), the domestic bourgeoisie has been relatively weak in terms of its economic resources and its political leverage, and parliamentary democracy has been dismantled, distorted, and deferred. In those countries where colonial era patterns of assimilation prevailed, by contrast, an effectively indigenous (Chinese *mestizo* or Sino-Thai) bourgeoisie has emerged, enjoying, to use Moore's language, "an independent economic base" and capable of attacking "obstacles to a democratic version of capitalism that have been inherited from the past."⁷⁴ Finally, in Malaysia and Indonesia efforts to create a properly national bourgeoisie have gradually increased the power of capital vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes. While successfully channeled and contained to date by the UMNO-led one party regime in Malaysia, this trend eventually undermined Suharto's dictatorship and impelled Indonesia into a belated process of democratization at the turn of the twenty-first century. Thus, while many institutional features of Southeast Asian states bear clear traces of distinctive colonial era lineages, the origins of dictatorship and democracy in the region must be seen as essentially social, rooted in the diverging patterns of class and identity formation that were already visible by the last decades of the nineteenth century.

If the arguments in defense of Moore's claim of correlation appear coherent and compelling, however, those in support of causation remain to be made. In terms of interests, it has often been argued, a vigorous and independent bourgeoisie is well served by the institutional features of formal democracy, most notably elections, in two important ways. First, the establishment of democratic institutions tends to encourage the demobilization and pacification of counterhegemonic social movements of subaltern groups through cooptation into nondisruptive, legalistic, and parliamentary arenas and activities. Second, the institutionalization of regular competitive elections works to reduce the more parasitic features of authoritarian states and to facilitate the exercise of influence over

military officers, bureaucrats, and professional politicians, given the sheer importance of money for election campaigns.⁷⁵ In terms of capacities, moreover, a vigorous and independent bourgeoisie is capable of wielding (or withdrawing) its considerable resources—in terms of control over capital, land and labor and ideological and international pressures—in support of democracy.⁷⁶ In terms of means, finally, a vigorous and independent bourgeoisie can withdraw its support for authoritarian rule through disinvestment and diversion of capital overseas, as seen in Indonesia in 1998. In addition, such a class can exploit an authoritarian regime's attempts to legitimate itself through elections by withholding campaign funds from the incumbent administration, backing the opposition, and supporting election-watch movements to combat electoral fraud and violence, as seen in the critical role of NAMFREL (the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections) in the downfall of Marcos in the Philippines in 1986.⁷⁷ In the absence of a social class capable of exercising voice in this fashion, incumbent administrations find it easy to prevent electoral defeat and turnover, given their direct and indirect control over the material resources necessary for machine-style voter mobilization, and thus it does not appear possible to establish democracy.

Two broader conclusions are in order. First, a mode of analysis rooted in comparative historical sociology can illuminate broad patterns of cross-national variance more fully than large-*n* quantitative analysis based on game theoretic modeling and the assumption famously expressed by Margaret Thatcher that "there is no such thing as 'society.'" A comparative analysis of class formation in Southeast Asia helps make sense of the observed outcomes left unexplained—and seemingly inexplicable—by accounts stressing macroeconomic variables (such as economic growth, income distribution, and oil revenues) and the institutional forms of authoritarian regimes (as argued by Barbara Geddes).

Second, these structuralist and rather Marxian arguments offer something of a counterpoint to the often celebratory and self-congratulatory accounts that portray, in un-self-consciously pluralist and voluntarist ways, democracy as a product of heroic struggles by civil society and a testimony to the triumph of human freedom. By so doing, they also suggest that the emerging study of the new democracies of Southeast Asia and other parts of the world should not focus so narrowly on individual political entrepreneurs and the institutional settings (legislatures, bureaucracies, political party systems) within which they pursue their interests and instead should keep in view the broader sociological context within which they are embedded.⁷⁸ After all, beyond the individual political entrepreneurs and veto players so exclusively spotlighted by many scholars in recent years, there are powerful classes of entrepreneurs exercising broader vetoes and other forms of structural power that continue to compromise and constrain what is known as democracy around the world today.

NOTES

1. Barrington S. Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
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3. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Economic and Political Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
4. Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience," *World Politics*, 55 (January 2003), 167–92; Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Conclusions," *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (August–September 2000), 703–34.
5. Based on this definition, periods of democratic rule can be identified in the Philippines from 1946 through 1972 and from at least 1992 (if not 1986) to the present; in Thailand in 1973–76, from at least 1988 through 1991, and 1992 through late 2006; and in Indonesia from 1999 through the present.
6. The persistent absence not only of turnover, but of serious oppositional threats to effective one party rule disqualifies both Malaysia and Singapore from inclusion among the democracies and strengthens the case for a structuralist analysis of dictatorship and democracy in Southeast Asia.
7. William Case, *Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or Less* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
8. Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1999), 115–44.
9. On the putative link between democratization and social inequality, see Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. For the debate on the significance of oil revenues for democratization, see, for example, Michael Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?," *World Politics*, 53 (April 2001), 325–61; Michael Herb, "No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy," *Comparative Politics*, 37 (April 2005), 297–316. For a recent contribution to the debate on Islam and democracy, see Vali Nasr, "The Rise of Muslim Democracy," *Journal of Democracy*, 16 (April 2005), 13–27.
10. Moore, p. 418.
11. *Ibid.*, p. xiii.
12. Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).
13. See, for example, Rajeswary Ampalavanar Brown, *Capital and Entrepreneurship in South-East Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
14. For a fine overview of such patterns, see G. William Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia," in Anthony Reid, ed., *Sojourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996), pp. 50–93.
15. John S. Furnivall, *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* (New York: New York University Press, 1944), pp. 304–5.
16. Carl A. Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).
17. Lim Teck Ghee, *Peasants and Their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya 1874–1941* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977).
18. William R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 91–125.
19. Philip Loh Fook Seng, *Seeds of Separatism: Educational Policy in Malaya 1874–1940* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975).
20. Moshe Yegar, *Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: Policies and Implementation* (Jerusalem: The Magues Press, 1979).
21. See Maurice Freedman, "The Growth of a Plural Society in Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, 33 (1960), 158–68; Charles Hirschman, "The Making of Race in Colonial Malaya: Political Economy and Racial Ideology,"

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22. Gordon P. Means, "'Special Rights' as a Strategy for Development," *Comparative Politics*, 5 (October 1972), 29–61.

23. G. William Skinner, "The Chinese Minority," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1963), pp. 97–117.

24. Skinner, "Creolized Chinese Societies," p. 70. See James R. Rush, *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860–1910* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 83–135.

25. See Michael Adas, *The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852–1941* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974); Khanh Tran, *The Ethnic Chinese and Economic Development in Vietnam* (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 1993); William E. Willmott, *The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Cambodia* (London: Athlone Press, 1970).

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28. On this period, see Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand*, ch. 3; Akira Suehiro, *Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855–1985* (Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1989), 16–105.

29. For a reconsideration and refinement of Skinner's analysis, see Kasian Tejapira, "Pigtail: A Pre-History of Chineseness in Siam," *Sojourn*, 7 (February 1992), 95–122.

30. G. William Skinner, "Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas: A Comparison of Thailand and Java," *Journal of the South Seas Society*, 16 (1960), 89, 91.

31. Heng Pek Koon, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), chs. 1 and 2.

32. Skinner, "Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas," p. 98.

33. Skinner, *Chinese Society in Thailand*, pp. 254, 298–300.

34. Suehiro, *Capital Accumulation in Thailand*, pp. 71–90, 110–22, 154–172.

35. On the steady growth of the Filipino Chinese business class (despite restrictions on immigration, landownership, and trade) during the American colonial period, see Kwok-Chu Wong, *The Chinese in the Philippine Economy, 1898–1941* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1999).

36. Robert H. Taylor, *The State in Burma* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 270–83, 341–56.

37. See Martin Gainsborough, *Changing Political Economy of Vietnam: The Case of Ho Chi Minh City* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).

38. See Kyaw Yin Hlaing, "The Politics of State-Business Relations in Post-Colonial Burma" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 2001).

39. See Caroline Hughes, *The Political Economy of Cambodia's Transition, 1991–2001* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).

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41. See Garry Rodan, *The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization: National State and International Capital* (London: Macmillan, 1989); E. C. Paul, *Obstacles to Democratization in Singapore* (Clayton: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).

42. Moore, *Social Origins*, p. xv.

43. See: Kunio Yoshihara, *Philippine Industrialization: Foreign and Domestic Capital* (Quezon City: Ateneo

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48. See Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, *In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to People Power in the Philippines* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2005).

49. Suehiro Akira, *Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855–1985* (Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies, 1989), 135–272.

50. See Ben Anderson, "Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 Coup," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 9 (July–September 1977), 13–30.

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56. On this pattern, see Koon.

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60. Peter Searle, *The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-seekers or Real Capitalists?* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999).

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62. See Charles A. Coppel, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1983), esp. pp. 52–72, 150–76.
63. Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), pp. 131–75, 211–70.
64. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 71–161.
65. Andrew MacIntyre, *Business and Politics in Indonesia* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990).
66. Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 71–102.
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69. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 133–61.
70. See John T. Sidel, “Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia’s New Order,” *Indonesia*, 66 (October 1998), 159–94.
71. See Tim Lindsey, “Reconstituting the Ethnic Chinese in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Law, Racial Discrimination, and Reform,” in Tim Lindsey and Helen Pausacker, ed., *Chinese Indonesians: Remembering, Distorting, Forgetting* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 41–76.
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